

1  
2  
3  
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6 DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT  
7 AND HOUSING,

8 Plaintiff,

9 v.

10 LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL  
11 INC,

12 Defendant.

Case No. 12-cv-01830-JCS

**ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND  
DENYING IN PART APPEAL OF BEST  
PRACTICES PANEL REPORT**

Re: Dkt. No. 220

13 **I. INTRODUCTION**

14 This case concerns the procedures used by Defendant Law School Admission Council Inc.  
15 (“LSAC”) to determine whether candidates should receive accommodation for disabilities while  
16 taking the Law School Admission Test (“LSAT”), a standardized test administered by LSAC and  
17 widely used in law school admissions. The United States and the California Department of Fair  
18 Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), as Plaintiffs,<sup>1</sup> claimed that LSAC’s procedures violated  
19 state and federal law protecting people with disabilities. The Parties reached a settlement,  
20 memorialized in a Consent Decree (dkt. 203), requiring certain changes to those procedures. The  
21 Consent Decree delegated aspects of those changes to a panel of experts selected by the Parties  
22 (the “Panel”), but allowed an appeal to the Court if the Panel’s decisions “are believed to violate  
23 the ADA or its implementing regulations, or California law where applicable, or to conflict with  
24 the provisions of [the Consent] Decree.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(d)(iv). LSAC now appeals several

25  
26 <sup>1</sup> The case also included a number of individual plaintiffs who are not involved in the present  
27 appeal. Those individuals are no longer party to this action, having released their claims by  
28 entering the Consent Decree. *See* Consent Decree ¶ 34. The Consent Decree only allows the  
United States, DFEH, or LSAC to enforce any violations thereof. *See id.* ¶¶ 30–31. In this Order,  
unless otherwise specified, the term “Plaintiffs” refers to DFEH and the United States, and the  
term “Parties” refers to DFEH, the United States, and LSAC.

1 aspects of the Panel’s final Report. The Court held a hearing on July 31, 2015. For the reasons  
 2 stated below, the Court finds portions of the Panel’s conclusions invalid, but upholds most of the  
 3 Panel’s Report.<sup>2</sup> A summary of the Court’s conclusions is included at the end of this Order.

## 4 **II. BACKGROUND**

### 5 **A. Procedural History**

6 DFEH brought this action against LSAC in state court in March of 2012, alleging that  
 7 LSAC’s process of considering requests to accommodate disabilities made by individuals seeking  
 8 to take the LSAT violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.  
 9 §§ 12101–213, and in doing so also violated California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code  
 10 § 51. The Court granted the United States’ motion to intervene as a plaintiff in October of 2012.  
 11 *See* dkt. 60.

12 The Parties reached a settlement and the Court accepted their proposed Consent Decree in  
 13 May of 2014. *See* Consent Decree. As discussed in more detail below, the Consent Decree  
 14 imposed certain obligations on LSAC, but delegated other issues to the Panel, made up of experts  
 15 to be selected by the Parties. *See generally id.* The Panel issued its final Report on January 26,  
 16 2015. *See* Mew Decl. Ex. A (Final Report of the Best Practices Panel, hereinafter “Report,” dkt.  
 17 220-2).

18 LSAC now appeals the Panel’s Report pursuant to paragraph 7(d)(iv) of the Consent  
 19 Decree, which provides that “any Party may appeal to the Court for appropriate relief if any of the  
 20 Panel’s final Best Practices, as written, are believed to violate the ADA or its implementing  
 21 regulations, or California law where applicable, or to conflict with the provisions of this Decree.”  
 22 Consent Decree ¶ 5(d)(iv). On June 23, 2015, with consent of the Parties, Judge Chen referred the  
 23 appeal to the undersigned magistrate judge for decision, and the parties have since consented to  
 24 the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all future proceedings in this case. *See*  
 25 dkt. 237, 241, 242. The Court held a hearing on LSAC’s appeal on July 31, 2015. *See* dkt. 239.

---

27 <sup>2</sup> The remaining Parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge to  
 28 resolve LSAC’s appeal, and have since consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned for all  
 future proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). *See* dkt. 237, 241, 242.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8

**B. Consent Decree**

The Consent Decree represents a comprehensive settlement of all parties' claims in this case, including provisions addressing injunctive relief, monetary damages to individual plaintiffs and other affected individuals, civil penalties, attorneys' fees, and ongoing auditing. *See generally* Consent Decree. LSAC's present appeal concerns the portion of the Consent Decree delegating certain issues to the Panel (Paragraph 7), as well as how that delegation is constrained by the portion of the Consent Decree setting standards for what documentation of disability LSAC may request (Paragraph 5).<sup>3</sup>

9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21

**1. Paragraph 5: Injunctive Relief Regarding Documentation Requests**

a. Paragraph 5(a): Certain Accommodations Previously Received

Paragraph 5 of the Consent Decree classifies requests for accommodations into two groups. The first group consists of applicants seeking certain accommodations that they have previously received on "any standardized examination offered in the United States related to applications for post-secondary admission." Consent Decree ¶ 5(a). LSAC must grant those accommodations so long as: (1) the applicant provides proof that the sponsor of the earlier test granted the accommodation; (2) the applicant checks a box certifying that he or she continues to experience the functional limitations that required accommodation; (3) the accommodation at issue is either an extension of time, up to double time, or a non-time accommodation listed in Exhibit 1 to the Consent Decree; and (4) the accommodation would not require administering testing on more than one day. *Id.* The treatment of requests meeting these criteria generally falls outside the scope of the Panel's Report and is not the focus of the present appeal.

b. Paragraphs 5(b)–(d): All Other Requests

All other requests for accommodation are governed by Paragraphs 5(b) through 5(d). LSAC's requests for documentation supporting such requests must be "reasonable and limited to the need for the testing accommodation requested." *Id.* ¶ 5(b). LSAC must "consider all facts and explanations offered by the candidate," must "give considerable weight to documentation of

22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

---

<sup>3</sup> This Order summarizes certain provisions of the Consent Decree implicated by the present appeal. It does not purport to recount all terms of the Consent Decree, or even all material terms of Paragraphs 5 and 7. The same is true of the discussion of the Panel's Report.

1 past testing accommodations received in similar testing situations not covered by Paragraph 5(a)”  
2 or in the context of certain formal special education settings, and must “consider documentation  
3 provided by a qualified professional who has made an individualized assessment of the candidate.”  
4 *Id.* ¶¶ 5(d)(i)–(iii) (footnote omitted). For requests for accommodation of mental or cognitive  
5 impairments, LSAC must allow candidates to submit evidence of “testing conducted within five  
6 years of the date of the request . . . instead of within three years as currently required for certain  
7 candidates.” *Id.* ¶ 5(d)(iv).

8 “LSAC may consider objective evidence relating to the candidate’s diagnosed impairment  
9 and its impact on the candidate.” *Id.* ¶ 5(d)(v). It may request supplemental information “if the  
10 documentation submitted by a candidate does not clearly establish the nature of the impairment or  
11 the need for requested testing accommodations,” and “may also have the documentation . . .  
12 reviewed by one or more qualified professionals.” *Id.* ¶ 5(d)(viii). LSAC may also “continue to  
13 ask evaluators whether a candidate was on his or her prescribed medication during the evaluation,”  
14 and to elaborate if relevant. *Id.* ¶ 5(g). LSAC “shall not reject or deny” an accommodation solely  
15 on the basis of a “candidate’s average or above average IQ score and/or high level of academic  
16 success,” or “solely because the candidate has no formal history of receiving that testing  
17 accommodation.” *Id.* ¶¶ 5(d)(vi)–(vii).

18 LSAC’s website must advise candidates of the documentation required for accommodation  
19 requests, inform them of common reasons for denial of requests, and provide a “non-exhaustive  
20 list of the types of testing accommodations available.” *Id.* ¶ 5(e). LSAC also must advise  
21 candidates: (1) that all requests for accommodation, supporting documentation, supplemental  
22 documentation as may be requested by LSAC, and any request for reconsideration must be  
23 submitted by the stated registration deadline for the LSAT; (2) that requests will generally be  
24 considered within fourteen days; and (3) that candidates who submit requests within two weeks of  
25 the registration deadline therefore may not have an opportunity to provide supplemental  
26 documentation or request reconsideration. *Id.* ¶ 5(f). The language of that notice is “subject to  
27 further direction from the Panel regarding the need for and availability of an appeals process and,  
28 if needed, what that process should be.” *Id.*

## 2. Paragraph 7: Best Practices Panel

1 The Panel consists of “five experts: two selected by LSAC; two selected by the United  
2 States and the DFEH; and a fifth selected by those four experts from a list prepared by the United  
3 States and the DFEH.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(a). Each member must have expertise in standardized  
4 testing accommodations, cognitive disabilities, or ADA compliance. *Id.* The Panel is charged  
5 with preparing “a written report establishing Best Practices that comport with the requirements of  
6 28 C.F.R. § 36.309, all of which LSAC shall implement to the extent that it is not already  
7 following such Best Practices.” *Id.* ¶ 7(b). “The Best Practices shall be consistent with the  
8 provisions of [the Consent] Decree and shall not violate the ADA or its implementing regulations,  
9 or California law where applicable.” *Id.* Some aspects of the Panel’s procedures are set by the  
10 Consent Decree, while others, including “how many of the five Panel members must agree on  
11 each Best Practice in order for it to be imposed,” are left to the discretion of the Panel. *See id.*  
12 ¶¶ 7(b), (d).

13 Paragraph 7(c) sets forth the “issues to be addressed by [the] Panel.” *Id.* ¶ 7(c) (heading;  
14 capitalization altered). This Order follows the practice of the Panel and the Parties in referring to  
15 these as “Issue 1” through “Issue 10,” although that numbering is not used in the Consent Decree.  
16 The disputed issues are as follows:

17 Issue 2: “The Panel shall consider and establish the type and scope of documentation that  
18 may be requested from candidates whose requests fall under Paragraphs 5(b)–(d) . . . .” *Id.*  
19 ¶ 7(c)(ii).

20 Issue 4: “The Panel shall determine whether more than one qualified professional should  
21 review a documented request for testing accommodations before LSAC may deny the request in  
22 whole or in part.” *Id.* ¶ 7(c)(iii)(2). Issues 4 through 10 are each characterized as “elements of the  
23 process for reviewing and evaluating testing accommodation requests.” *Id.* ¶ 7(c)(iii).

24 Issue 5: “The Panel shall consider and establish criteria and guidelines for use by persons  
25 who review or evaluate testing accommodation requests.” *Id.* ¶ 7(c)(iii)(3).

26 Issue 8: “The Panel shall consider whether an automatic review of partial and/or full  
27 denials is warranted and, if warranted, how such a review should be conducted.” *Id.* ¶ 7(c)(iii)(6).  
28

1            Issue 9: “The Panel shall consider whether there should be a process available, beyond that  
2 already provided by LSAC, to candidates who wish to seek review of LSAC’s decision to deny a  
3 candidate’s request and, if so, what that process should be relative to LSAC’s existing registration  
4 deadlines.” *Id.* ¶ 7(c)(iii)(7).

5            Issue 10: “The Panel shall consider and establish the parameters, such as content and  
6 timing of, training for persons (both LSAC staff and outside consultants) who evaluate or review  
7 testing accommodation requests.” *Id.* ¶ 7(c)(iii)(8).

8            The issues for which LSAC does not directly dispute the Panel’s conclusions are: Issue 1,  
9 recommendations on how to diversify LSAC’s expert consultants, *id.* ¶ 7(c)(i); Issue 3,  
10 qualifications for internal and external reviewers of accommodation requests, *id.* ¶ 7(c)(iii)(1);  
11 Issue 6, parameters for written recommendations and decisions by internal and external reviewers  
12 and consultants, *id.* ¶ 7(c)(iii)(4); and Issue 7, whether LSAC should provide written explanations  
13 to candidates who are denied accommodations, and if so, the parameters for such explanations, *id.*  
14 ¶ 7(c)(iii)(5).

15            Paragraph 7(c) concludes by stating that “[t]he Best Practices shall not invalidate or  
16 conflict with any other provisions of [the Consent] Decree.” *Id.* ¶ 7(c)(iv). Any Party may appeal  
17 to the Court if the Panel’s decisions “are believed to violate the ADA or its implementing  
18 regulations, or California law where applicable, or to conflict with the provisions of [the Consent]  
19 Decree.” *Id.* ¶ 7(d)(iv).

### 20            **C. Panel Report**

21            In accordance with the Consent Decree, the Panel determined that agreement by at least  
22 four of its five members would be sufficient. Report at 2 (citing Consent Decree ¶ 7(b)). Four  
23 members joined in the final Report, while the fifth wrote a separate “Minority Report.” *See* Mew  
24 Decl. Ex. B (Shelby Keiser, M.S., “Best Practices Panel Minority Report,” dkt. 220-3). The  
25 majority consisted of Dr. Nicole Ofiesh, Ph.D., chosen by Plaintiffs as an expert in testing  
26 accommodations, Dr. Charles Golden, Ph.D., chosen by LSAC as an expert in cognitive  
27 disabilities, Dr. Nancy Mather, Ph.D., chosen by Plaintiffs as an expert in cognitive disabilities,  
28 and Professor Ruth Colker, J.D., nominated by Plaintiffs as an expert in ADA compliance and

1 chosen by the remainder of the Panel from a list of three nominees. *See* Report; Appeal (dkt. 220)  
 2 at 9; Opp’n (dkt. 221) at 4–5. Shelby Keiser, M.S., chosen by LSAC as an expert in testing  
 3 accommodations, prepared the Minority Report.<sup>4</sup> *See* Minority Report; Appeal at 9; Opp’n at 4.

4 The Panel recognizes in its Report that it was charged with addressing the ten issues  
 5 identified in Paragraph 7(c) of the Consent Decree. Report at 2 (“The Consent Decree specifies  
 6 ten issues for the Panel to resolve . . .”). Although the Panel concluded that certain issues tend to  
 7 overlap, it organized its Report into ten sections based on those issues. The conclusions  
 8 challenged by LSAC are discussed below in the analysis portion of this Order.

9 **D. Parties’ Arguments**

10 LSAC brings this appeal seeking to invalidate substantial portions of the Panel’s Report.  
 11 *See generally* Appeal. It also seeks make comparatively small corrective additions to the Report,  
 12 most of which mirror language in the Consent Decree. LSAC’s proposed changes are summarized  
 13 in a “redline” of the Report, in which proposed deletions are highlighted in yellow and proposed  
 14 additions are highlighted in blue. Mew Decl. Ex. P (“LSAC Redline,” dkt. 220-17).

15 LSAC’s Appeal opens with discussion of the “Parties’ presentation of their views to the  
 16 Panel,” “the Panel’s draft report,” “the Minority Report,” and “actions by certain panel members  
 17 after issuing the final report.” Appeal at 6–11 (headings; capitalization altered). LSAC appears to  
 18 present this background to demonstrate purported bias by the Panel against LSAC or in favor of  
 19 Plaintiffs. LSAC does not, however, make an argument that any of this history affects the legal  
 20 validity of the final Report.

21 LSAC’s substantive argument is directed to the Panel’s conclusions regarding Issues 2, 4,  
 22 5, 8, 9, and 10. *Id.* at 13–32. According to LSAC, the Report exceeds the Panel’s authority under  
 23 the ten issues delegated to it and conflicts with portions of the Consent Decree. *See id.* LSAC  
 24 contends that certain provisions of the Report that may not directly conflict with the language of  
 25 the Consent Decree nevertheless constitute conflicts because they upset the Parties’ “narrowly-  
 26 drawn compromise”—for example, where LSAC argues that the Report requires it to provide

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
 28 <sup>4</sup> LSAC conceded at the July 31, 2015 hearing that the Minority Report is not legally relevant to  
 the issue before the Court—whether the majority’s Report conflicts with the Consent Decree.

1 permissive treatment to a wider class of accommodation requests than specified in the Consent  
2 Decree. *See id.* at 22. LSAC also at times argues that the Panel’s conclusions are not, in fact, best  
3 practices and fail to take into account important considerations regarding the standardization of  
4 standardized testing, *e.g., id.* at 25, or that procedures set by the Panel are “virtually impossible to  
5 operationalize,” *id.* at 31. LSAC’s opening brief concludes with an argument on the merits of best  
6 practices for standardized testing accommodations. *Id.* at 33–35.

7 Plaintiffs argue in opposition that the Panel complied with its mandate under the Consent  
8 Decree and that all provisions of the Report represent proper exercises of the Panel’s authority.  
9 *See generally* Opp’n. Plaintiffs contend that the Panel had broad authority under the Consent  
10 Decree, including to “lay[] out the circumstances under which LSAC should grant a request for  
11 testing accommodations.” *See id.* at 19. Plaintiffs do not themselves appeal any part of the  
12 Report, and do not concede that any portion is invalid. *See generally id.*

13 The parties’ arguments regarding each disputed issue are discussed in more detail in the  
14 context of the Court’s analysis below.

#### 15 **E. Amicus Letters**

16 Seventeen “professionals with expertise in diagnosing disabilities, evaluating resulting  
17 functional limitations, and recommending academic and testing accommodations” submitted a  
18 letter to the Court as amici curiae dated April 24, 2015. Dkt. 222. The Inter Organizational  
19 Practice Committee (IOPC), a coalition of neuropsychological professional associations, filed an  
20 amicus letter dated June 3, 2015. Dkt. 232. Both letters dispute certain aspects of the Panel’s  
21 Report on the merits, arguing that they are not, in fact, “best practices” for determining how and  
22 when to grant testing accommodations. By order of the Court, LSAC and Plaintiffs each filed a  
23 response to each letter. Dkts. 225, 226, 233, 234. As discussed below, the Consent Decree  
24 provides a limited right to appeal to the Court, which does not include any right to appeal the  
25 merits of the Panel’s decisions.



1 **III. ANALYSIS**

2 **A. Legal Standards**

3 **1. Interpretation of the Consent Decree**

4 “A consent decree, which has attributes of a contract and a judicial act, is construed with  
5 reference to ordinary contract principles.” *Nehmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs*, 494 F.3d  
6 846, 861 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting *City of Las Vegas v. Clark County*, 755 F.2d 697, 702 (9th Cir.  
7 1985)). The Supreme Court set forth the applicable standard as follows:

8 Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful  
9 negotiation has produced agreement on their precise terms. The  
10 parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case  
11 and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of  
12 litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a  
13 compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of  
14 risk, the parties each give up something they might have won had  
15 they proceeded with the litigation. Thus the decree itself cannot be  
16 said to have a purpose; rather the parties have purposes, generally  
17 opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of  
18 those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the  
19 bargaining power and skill to achieve. For these reasons, the scope  
20 of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners, and  
21 not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the  
22 parties to it. Because the defendant has, by the decree, waived his  
23 right to litigate the issues raised, a right guaranteed to him by the  
24 Due Process Clause, the conditions upon which he has given that  
25 waiver must be respected, and the instrument must be construed as it  
26 is written, and not as it might have been written had the plaintiff  
27 established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation.

18 *United States v. Armour & Co.*, 402 U.S. 673, 681–82 (1971). Accordingly, arguments that  
19 “would have great force if addressed to a court that had the responsibility for formulating original  
20 relief in this case, after the factual and legal issues raised by the pleadings had been litigated,” may  
21 nevertheless be “out of place” in “deal[ing] with the construction of an existing consent decree.”  
22 *Id.* at 681.

23 **2. Review of the Panel’s Report**

24 Neither party cites any authority addressing the interpretation of a report prepared by  
25 experts who have been delegated authority under a consent decree to set certain standards for the  
26 parties. The Court applies basic principles of contract interpretation, relying primarily on the plain  
27 language of the Report.

28 In terms of the scope of review, the Consent Decree provides for “an appeal to the Court

1 for appropriate relief if any of the Panel’s final Best Practices, as written, are believed to violate  
 2 the ADA or its implementing regulations, or California law where applicable, or to conflict with  
 3 the provisions of this Decree.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(d)(iv). Although not separately stated as a  
 4 basis for appeal, the Consent Decree grants the Panel authority only as to ten enumerated issues.  
 5 *See id.* ¶ 7(c). The Court therefore concludes that any directive from the Panel that exceeds that  
 6 authority “conflict[s] with the provisions of [the Consent] Decree” and is a proper subject of  
 7 appeal. *See id.* ¶ 7(d)(iv).

8 Review beyond the scope specified—i.e., for anything other than conflicts with the  
 9 Consent Decree or violations of the ADA or California law—is not permitted. The Parties elected  
 10 to delegate certain issues to a panel of experts with experience in relevant fields. That decision is  
 11 not subject to second-guessing at this stage—the Consent Decree does not permit the Court to  
 12 substitute its judgment for that of the Panel on the merits of how requests for accommodation  
 13 should be reviewed and decided. To the extent that the Parties and amici argue merely that the  
 14 Panel erred in determining how best to resolve those issues actually delegated to it, such  
 15 arguments are “out of place.” *See Armour & Co.*, 402 U.S. at 681.

## 16 **B. Issue 2: Type and Scope of Documentation**

### 17 **1. The Panel’s Report**

18 In response to its charge to “establish the type and scope of documentation that may be  
 19 requested,” the Panel concluded that LSAC’s existing requirements were “excessive for most  
 20 candidates who seek testing accommodations on the LSAT and inconsistent with the  
 21 documentation guidelines of other national testing entities.” *Id.* at 4. Specifically, the Panel  
 22 rejected LSAC’s practice of requiring evidence of specific diagnostic tests rather than leaving the  
 23 choice of diagnostic technique to the qualified professional who diagnosed the candidate. *Id.* The  
 24 Panel instead developed a system of different documentation requirements for three categories of  
 25 candidates, based on the principle “that the required level of documentation shall depend upon the  
 26 nature of the request for testing accommodations.” *Id.* at 5.

27 “Category 1” consists of candidates who “request[] a testing accommodation that does not  
 28 modify the amount of time permitted to respond to the questions in each test section.” *Id.* The

1 Report lists a number of examples, including “permission to bring in food,” “stop-the-clock  
2 breaks,” “assignment to a wheelchair-accessible room,” and provision of a “sign language  
3 interpreter to sign spoken instructions.” *Id.* at 5–6. Candidates requesting such accommodations  
4 need only provide “evidence of a disability from a qualified professional who examined the  
5 candidate any time after the candidate reached the age of 13, and a statement that provides a  
6 reasonable explanation for why the candidate needs the testing accommodation to best ensure that  
7 the LSAT results accurately reflect [his or her] aptitude or achievement level.” *Id.* at 6 (footnotes  
8 omitted). The candidate may provide the statement. *Id.*

9 “Category 2” consists of any candidates requesting up to 50% extra time, as well as  
10 candidates with visual impairments that require an alternative test format requesting up to 100%  
11 extra time. *Id.* at 7. The requirements are the same as for Category 1 above, except that the  
12 statement explaining the need for accommodation “should be supported with appropriate data or  
13 other relevant information in support of the request.” *Id.*

14 “Category 3” consists of any candidate requesting more time than allowed for Category  
15 2—more than 50% extra without a visual impairment, or more than 100% extra with a qualifying  
16 visual impairment. This standard is similar to Category 2, but requires that, in addition to being  
17 supported by “data or other relevant information,” the statement “should explain why more than  
18 50% extra time is necessary.” *Id.* at 7–8.

19 The Panel provided additional guidance regarding the substance of accommodation  
20 requests under all three categories—as well as special guidance for Category 3 requests—as part  
21 of its response to Issue 5, discussed below. *See id.* at 6 (“The type of acceptable documentation is  
22 described in response to Issue 5, Part I.”); *id.* at 8 (referencing “Issue 5, Part II, Standards for  
23 Determining More Than Fifty Percent Extra Time”). If the candidate submits the required  
24 documentation for the appropriate category, “then LSAC shall approve the requested testing  
25 accommodations, without requiring the candidate to provide additional information.” *Id.* at 6–8.

## 26 **2. LSAC’s Objections and the Court’s Conclusions**

27 LSAC first objects to the Panel’s documentation standards to the extent that they impose  
28 “mandatory outcomes.” Appeal at 13–14. This objection is largely intertwined with Issue 2’s

1 incorporation of the standards for review set forth in response to Issue 5, and tends to implicate the  
 2 Panel’s authority under the latter issue to set “criteria and guidelines” for use by reviewers. It is  
 3 therefore addressed in this Order under the heading “Issue 5: Criteria and Guidelines for  
 4 Reviewers,” below.

5 LSAC also objects to this portion of the Report on the basis that the “Decree does not  
 6 authorize the Panel to create categories of individuals who will be subject to different treatment  
 7 depending on the nature of their impairment and the amount of extra time they request.” Appeal at  
 8 14. The Court disagrees. The Consent Decree charges the Panel with “establish[ing] the type and  
 9 scope of appropriate documentation that may be requested from candidates whose requests fall  
 10 under Paragraph 5(b)–(d),” i.e., all requests other than those for certain accommodations  
 11 previously granted on another post-secondary standardized test. Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(ii).  
 12 Nothing in the Consent Decree requires that those standards must be identical for all such  
 13 requests.<sup>5</sup>

14 LSAC objects to the Panel discussing standards for granting certain accommodations not  
 15 listed in Exhibit 1 of the Consent Decree. Appeal at 15 (“The last three accommodations  
 16 identified by the Panel on page 6 of the Final Report are not listed in Exhibit 1 to the Consent  
 17 Decree and cannot be imposed on LSAC.”). This argument misconstrues the nature of Exhibit 1,  
 18 which is titled “Testing Accommodations Available Under Consent Decree Paragraph 5(a).”  
 19 Consent Decree Ex. 1. That paragraph concerns accommodations that will be granted  
 20 automatically to candidates who have previously received them on other post-secondary  
 21 standardized tests. Nothing in the Consent Decree indicates that those are the only  
 22 accommodations that will be available to any candidates under the standard of review discussed in  
 23 Paragraphs 5(b) through (d) and delegated in part to the Panel. To the contrary, the Consent  
 24 Decree requires LSAC to provide on its website “a non-exhaustive list of the types of testing  
 25 accommodations available,” *id.* ¶ 5(e), which would make little sense if an exhaustive list was  
 26

---

27 <sup>5</sup> LSAC raises a similar objection to the Panel setting different standards of review for different  
 28 impairments and accommodations in the context of Issue 5. Appeal at 26. Again, the Court finds  
 no requirement that the Panel set identical standards for all requests for accommodation.

1 available as an exhibit to the Consent Decree. The Court finds that Exhibit 1 has no bearing on  
 2 the types of accommodation available under Paragraphs 5(b) through (d), and that the Panel  
 3 therefore did not err by discussing other accommodations in its Report.

4 LSAC objects to the Panel’s conclusion that candidates should be able to submit  
 5 “[e]vidence of a disability from a qualified professional who examined the candidate *any time*  
 6 *after the candidate reached the age of 13.*” Appeal at 15 (quoting Report at 6, 7) (emphasis in  
 7 original). LSAC argues that this conflicts with Paragraph 5(d)(iv) of the Consent Decree, which  
 8 provides that LSAC will permit candidates seeking accommodation of a mental or cognitive  
 9 impairment “to submit testing conducted within five years of the date of the request . . . instead of  
 10 within three years as currently required for certain candidates.” Consent Decree ¶ 5(d)(iv) The  
 11 Court agrees, but only to a point. Paragraph 5(d)(iv) only concerns mental or cognitive  
 12 impairments.<sup>6</sup> For candidates seeking accommodation of such impairments, that paragraph  
 13 controls, and LSAC need not accept documentation older than five years.<sup>7</sup> For candidates seeking  
 14 accommodation of other forms of impairment, however, there is no conflict between the Panel’s  
 15 conclusion and the Consent Decree, and the requirement that LSAC accept documentation from an  
 16 examination any time after the candidate turned 13 falls within the Panel’s authority to “establish  
 17 the type and scope of appropriate documentation that may be requested.” *See* Consent Decree  
 18 ¶ 7(c)(ii). LSAC is therefore bound by this provision of the Report except as to requests for  
 19 accommodation of mental or cognitive impairments.

20 LSAC finally argues that Paragraph 5(d)(viii) of the Consent Decree, which provides that  
 21 “LSAC may make a timely request for supplemental information if the documentation submitted

---

23 <sup>6</sup> LSAC asserts that the Consent Decree “provides that LSAC can require documentation . . . from  
 24 within the past five years for candidates seeking accommodations based on mental or cognitive  
 25 impairment, *and within three years for all other candidates.*” Appeal at 15–16 (emphasis added).  
 26 The last part of that sentence does not accurately reflect the terms of the Consent Decree, which  
 27 provides only that LSAC’s existing policy imposes a three-year limitation on documentation for  
 28 “certain candidates.” Consent Decree ¶ 5(d)(iv). The Consent Decree does not discuss a three-  
 year limitation for “all other candidates,” nor does it provide that the existing three-year policy—  
 whatever its scope—cannot be altered by the Panel under its authority to set standards for  
 documentation pursuant to Issue 2.

<sup>7</sup> Despite maintaining that they “endorse the Panel’s recommendation as a Best Practice for all  
 candidates,” Plaintiffs all but concede that it conflicts with the Consent Decree with respect to  
 requests based on mental and cognitive impairments. *See* Opp’n at 13 n.11.

1 by a candidate does not clearly establish the nature of the impairment or the need for requested  
2 testing accommodations,” Consent Decree ¶ 5(d)(viii), forecloses the Panel’s conclusions  
3 regarding appropriate documentation. Appeal at 16–17. Specifically, LSAC objects to provisions  
4 deeming sufficient “a statement that provides a reasonable explanation for why the candidate  
5 needs the testing accommodation,” which may be provided by the candidate, and to provisions  
6 stating that “[i]f a candidate meets these documentation requirements, which are not intended to be  
7 extensive, and provides a reasonable explanation for why these testing accommodations . . . LSAC  
8 shall approve the requested testing accommodations, without requiring the candidate to provide  
9 additional information.” Appeal at 16–17 (quoting Report at 6–8).

10 The Court finds no conflict between Paragraph 5(d)(viii) and the Panel’s response to Issue  
11 2. Through the documentation requirements discussed in response to this issue and the criteria  
12 and guidelines for reviewers discussed in response to Issue 5, the Panel essentially defined what  
13 documentation suffices to “clearly establish the nature of the impairment or the need for . . .  
14 accommodations.” *See* Consent Decree ¶ 5(d)(viii). Further, as discussed below in the context of  
15 Issue 5, the process envisioned by the Panel still calls upon evaluators to use their professional  
16 judgment in applying the criteria established by the Report. A reviewer might determine that a  
17 candidate’s explanation of need for accommodation is not “reasonable,” or that the documentation  
18 the candidate submits from a qualified professional is not “evidence of a disability.” *See* Report at  
19 6–8. The process through which a reviewer may reach such a determination is discussed further in  
20 the portion of this Order addressing Issue 5, below. If the candidate’s submission does not meet  
21 the documentation required under Issue 2, “LSAC may make a timely request for supplemental  
22 information” pursuant to Paragraph 5(d)(viii).

23 Plaintiffs are correct that LSAC’s proposed revisions to the section of the Report  
24 addressing Issue 2 would essentially reduce it to restating Paragraph 5(d)(viii) of the Consent  
25 Decree, improperly nullifying Paragraph 7(c)(ii), which provides that the Panel shall set standards  
26 for the documentation LSAC may request. *See* Opp’n at 12; LSAC Redline at 4–8. The Court  
27 finds no basis to invalidate the documentation standards set forth in the Report, except as  
28 discussed above in the context of outdated mental or cognitive testing.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12

**C. Issue 4: Multiple Reviewers Before Denial**

This issue charged the Panel with determining “whether more than one qualified professional should review a documented request for testing accommodations before LSAC may deny the request in whole or in part.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(2). The Panel determined “that all accommodations that are not granted in full must be reviewed by one or two outside consultants,” as “discussed [in more detail] in response to Issue 8.” Report at 9. LSAC only objects to this response to the extent that it incorporates purportedly improper conclusions from the Panel’s response to Issue 8. *See* Appeal at 29. LSAC also challenges “the Panel’s recommendations on Issue 6, but only to the extent that they incorporate by reference objectionable recommendations in Issue 8.” *Id.* at 29 n.24. The Court’s analysis of the Panel’s response to Issue 8, and of LSAC’s objections to that response, falls under the heading “Issue 8: Automatic Review of Denials,” below.

13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18

**D. Issue 5: Criteria and Guidelines for Reviewers**

This issue required that the Panel “consider and establish criteria and guidelines for use by persons who review or evaluate testing accommodation requests.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(3). The Panel developed a two-step process to determine first “whether or not a candidate has a disability,” and second “whether LSAC should approve the candidate’s request for testing accommodations.” *See* Report at 11.

19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

**1. The Panel’s Report**

a. Overview and General Principles Regarding Issue 5

Before delving into the two steps, the Report sets forth a number of general rules and guidelines for review. According to the Panel, “[i]t shall be the role of the LSAC reviewer(s) to look for evidence that supports the candidate’s request for testing accommodations, rather than to look for evidence that denies the candidate’s request,” and “[a]ll reviewers shall begin the process with the presumption that the testing accommodation is justified.” *Id.* LSAC “should accept, without further inquiry, ‘documentation provided by a qualified professional<sup>8</sup> who has made an

27  
28

---

<sup>8</sup> The Panel adopts the definition of “qualified professional” used in the official guidance to the federal ADA implementing regulations: “a person who is ‘licensed or otherwise properly credentialed and possess[es] expertise in the disability for which modifications or accommodations

1 individualized assessment of a candidate that supports the need for the . . . accommodation . . .  
 2 requested,” giving precedence to “experts who have personal familiarity with the candidate” over  
 3 reviewers who have not met the candidate. *Id.* at 10 (quoting 28 C.F.R. Part 36 App. A (guidance  
 4 regarding 28 C.F.R. § 36.309)).

5 The Panel endorsed the Consent Decree’s requirement that LSAC provide  
 6 accommodations that candidates previously received on other standardized tests, and further  
 7 determined that “an established history of testing accommodations” on non-standardized tests,  
 8 such as university examinations, “shall presumptively support the request for the provision of  
 9 similar testing accommodations on the LSAT.” *Id.* at 11. It also determined that “LSAC shall  
 10 presumptively grant testing accommodation requests that do not involve requests for extended  
 11 time,” so long as the candidate submits adequate documentation of his or her disability. *Id.*

12 Finally, the Report states that “[n]othing in these criteria or standards prevents the  
 13 reviewer from using his or her professional judgment, but these decisions must be clearly  
 14 explained in detail.” *Id.* at 12 (emphasis added). A reviewer “must provide a specific written  
 15 explanation in support of” any denial of a requested accommodation, and must “provide a clear  
 16 statement of what documentation is necessary” in response to any request that lacks adequate  
 17 documentation. *Id.* at 11–12.

18 **b. Issue 5 Part 1: Whether a Candidate Has a Disability**

19 The Report divides its discussion of this sub-issue further into two sections. First, it  
 20 discusses what documentation is sufficient if the candidate has “a record of a disability.” *Id.* at 12,  
 21 ¶ 1. The Report states that if a candidate presents documentation that he or she has been  
 22 recognized as having a disability under any of several specified educational programs, the  
 23 candidate “will be found to have a disability.” *Id.* at 12–13, ¶¶ 1(a)(i)–(iv). The same is true if  
 24 the candidate presents documentation of a disability from a medical doctor or other qualified  
 25 professional who has examined the candidate. *Id.* at 13, ¶¶ 1(a)(v)–(vi). Under any of these  
 26 circumstances, the candidate must also “certif[y] that he or she continues to have a disability.” *Id.*

27  
 28 are sought.” Report at 10 (quoting 28 C.F.R. Part 36 App. A (guidance regarding 28 C.F.R.  
 § 36.309)) (alteration in original).



1 at 13, ¶ 1(b).

2 The second subpart addresses candidates who “do[] not have a record of a disability.” *Id.*  
 3 at 13, ¶ 2. The Report cautions that someone who receives an average overall score on a test of a  
 4 specific skill may still warrant accommodation if they have ongoing, verifiable difficulty with that  
 5 skill due to a disability. *Id.* at 13, ¶ 2(a). It presents as an example someone who “receives  
 6 average scores on a reading test,” but whose “history . . . reveal[s] special education in first grade  
 7 and several years of individualized tutoring, and who as an adult “may have trouble reading for  
 8 long periods of time” and find “the act of reading . . . difficult and effortful . . . as compared to  
 9 most people.”<sup>9</sup> *Id.* The Panel recommends that such a person be granted accommodations. *Id.*

10 In terms of documentation, the distinction between a candidate with a “record of a  
 11 disability” and one who “does not have a record of a disability” is not entirely clear. As discussed  
 12 above, documentation from a qualified professional is presented as one way to establish a “record  
 13 of a disability.” *See id.* at 13, ¶¶ 1(a)(v)–(vi). The only examples given of evidence sufficient to  
 14 show a non-record disability are, similarly, where a “qualified professional has provided  
 15 documentation that the candidate has a disability, which restricts the candidate’s ability to  
 16 demonstrate his or her aptitude or achievement,” and where a “qualified professional has provided  
 17 documentation that an individual has a temporary disability . . . which restricts the candidate’s  
 18 ability to demonstrate his or her aptitude or achievement.” *Id.* at 14, ¶¶ 2(b)(i)–(ii). The Report  
 19 notes that such evidence is “not limited to” these examples, *id.* at 14, ¶ 2(b), and concludes this  
 20 section by cautioning against denying accommodations based on the absence of historical  
 21 documentation, noting a number of specific factors that “can delay the identification of a  
 22 disability,” *id.* at 14, ¶ 2(c).

---

23  
 24  
 25 <sup>9</sup> This example, also discussed elsewhere in the Report, is somewhat unintuitive, and is a subject  
 26 of criticism in the Minority Report. *See* Minority Report at 1 (“[D]esignating individuals who  
 27 have ‘average overall reading abilities’ as disabled for the purpose of receiving an accommodation  
 28 . . . does not properly reflect the ADA’s definition of a disability nor does it reflect the spirit of  
 fairness inherent in the law.”). The Court understands the Panel’s position to be that if someone is  
 significantly impaired in reading ability by, for example, dyslexia, but able to compensate for that  
 impairment to the extent that he or she can achieve overall average scores on reading tests by other  
 abilities, such as superior analytical ability, that person should receive accommodations for his or  
 her reading disabilities so that the LSAT accurately reflects his or her other superior abilities.

c. Issue 5 Part 2: What Accommodations Are Appropriate

This section lays out the Report’s most substantive guidance on how LSAC should determine whether to approve requests for accommodations. It is further divided into two subparts: the first subpart addresses requests for non-time-based accommodations and extra time up to 50% (or up to 100% for visual impairments); the second addresses requests for greater than 50% extra time (or greater than 100% for visual impairments).

i. Standards for Non-Time-Based Accommodations and Accommodations Not Exceeding 50% Extra Time, or 100% Extra Time for Visual Impairments

Based on the ADA regulations’ requirement that considerable weight be given to past accommodations, the Report requires that LSAC provide accommodations comparable to those that a candidate has received in virtually any other test setting, including “K-12 formal [or] informal testing accommodations,” so long as the request does not exceed 50% extra time. *See id.* at 15, ¶¶ 1(a)–(b) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(1)(v)). The Report notes, however, that a lack of past testing accommodations does not establish a lack of present need for accommodations. *Id.* at 15, ¶ 1(c).

If the candidate has not previously received an accommodation, he or she “should provide documentation to justify each requested testing accommodation but the burden on the candidate shall be no higher than [it would have been] if he or she had sought such testing accommodations earlier in his or her educational career.” *Id.* at 16, ¶ 2(a). The candidate must provide a diagnosis of disability from a qualified professional, and an explanation by the candidate, qualified professional, or a teacher of the “accommodation as it relates to the candidate’s disability.” *Id.* at 16, ¶¶ 2(b)–(c). So long as the request does not exceed 50% extra time, no further documentation is required. *Id.* at 16, ¶ 2(d).

The Report also “provide[s] minimum standards that LSAC shall use when determining if a request for a testing accommodation [based on certain specified disabilities] is appropriate.” *Id.* at 16, ¶ 3(a). It identifies a number of disabilities that, if a diagnosis is adequately documented, should justify “a minimum of 50% extra time,” specifically “learning disabilities,” ADHD, “major psychiatric disorders,” and (with a history of receiving extra time or “a reasonable explanation”)

1 “writing disorders.” *Id.* at 16–18, ¶¶ 3(b)(i)–(iii), (vi). Candidates with visual impairments “shall  
 2 be allowed to use the testing accommodations that they document they have used in the past,” and  
 3 if they use “a reader, computer reader (text-to-speech), braille or other similar alternatives [then  
 4 they] shall be granted 100% extra time.” *Id.* at 17, ¶ 3(b)(iv). This section of the Report also  
 5 provides for other non-time-based accommodations for certain disabilities, including that, for  
 6 writing disabilities, “LSAC shall approve requests for the use of a computer, and spell check, for  
 7 any individual with the history of using such assistive devices in school or work settings.”<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at  
 8 18, ¶ 3(b)(vi).

9 ii. Standards for Requests Exceeding 50% Extra Time, or 100% Extra Time  
 10 for Visual Impairments

11 “It is the Panel’s opinion that 50% additional time is a reasonable amount of time in most  
 12 cases,” presumably—based on the provisions discussed above—excluding cases of visual  
 13 impairment. *Id.* at 18. The Report nevertheless discusses a number of conditions under which a  
 14 candidate should receive more than 50% extra time, including (1) where the candidate received  
 15 more than 50% extra time “on any past standardized test,” (2) “where more than 50% extra time  
 16 can be shown to have been granted as a consistent testing accommodation, and was approved by  
 17 an appropriate professional,” and (3) “if a postsecondary disability service provider provides a  
 18 signed statement indicating that a candidate was provided with more than 50% additional time on  
 19 college examinations.” *Id.* at 18–19, ¶¶ 1, 4.

20 Otherwise, a qualified professional may provide “documentation with a reasonable  
 21 explanation that supports the need for more than 50% extra time” for either the entire LSAT or  
 22 certain sections thereof, and the LSAC reviewer must base his or decision on that documentation  
 23 and “give substantial weight to the recommendation of the qualified professional.” *Id.* at 19,  
 24 ¶¶ 2–3. As an example of an accommodation for a specific section of the test, the Report states  
 25 that “for individuals with visual impairments who are routinely granted 100% extra time, 150%

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
 27 <sup>10</sup> Read broadly, this is a somewhat odd recommendation, as a vast number of non-disabled  
 28 students and employees use computers and spell check functions in school and work settings. The  
 Court understands the Report’s use of the words “such accommodations” to limit this guidance to  
 candidates who have been allowed to use these tools as accommodations for impairments in  
 circumstances where they are not otherwise provided.

1 extra time shall be allowed on the analytical reasoning section of the LSAT exam because of its  
 2 reliance on visual-spatial abilities.” *Id.* at 19, ¶ 3. The Report also provides that “more than 50%  
 3 extra time shall be given to an individual who, because of health or sensory impairments on  
 4 psychiatric disorders, warrants such time to demonstrate his or her achievement or aptitude.” *Id.*  
 5 at 19 ¶ 5. The example given for that provision involves a case of multiple diagnoses, where the  
 6 additional effect of a second impairment renders inadequate the 50% extra time routinely given for  
 7 the first impairment. *Id.*

8 More generally, LSAC should grant more than 50% extra time “[a]s long as sufficient  
 9 evidence is presented,” LSAC should not suggest a partial accommodation (for example, 75%  
 10 extra time where 100% has been requested), and reviewers “may use clinical judgment to support  
 11 a candidate’s request for extended time.” *Id.* at 19–20, ¶¶ 6–7. “In cases where the request is for  
 12 a 100% time extension or greater and a reasonable explanation is provided, the test shall be  
 13 administered over two consecutive days, if the candidate requests that testing accommodation.”  
 14 *Id.* at 20, ¶ 9.

## 15 **2. LSAC’s Arguments and the Court’s Conclusions**

### 16 a. Criteria, Guidelines, and Outcomes

17 LSAC argues that the Panel exceeded its authority in a number of instances “by mandating  
 18 outcomes rather than establishing ‘criteria and guidelines’ for reviewing candidate  
 19 documentation.” Appeal at 20; *see also id.* at 17–18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27–29 (presenting  
 20 forms of this objection in the context of Issue 5); *id.* at 13–17 (making similar arguments in the  
 21 context of Issue 2). LSAC’s position turns on an unreasonably limited reading of the word  
 22 “criteria.” While the word “guidelines” certainly implies something less than a strict rule, the  
 23 Consent Decree does not limit the Panel’s role to setting “guidelines” It charges the Panel with  
 24 establishing “*criteria and guidelines* for use by persons who review or evaluate testing  
 25 accommodation requests.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(3) (emphasis added). Unlike “guidelines,”  
 26 the word “criteria” is commonly used to describe the elements of a rule. If each criterion is met, a  
 27 certain outcome may be compelled. *See, e.g., Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell*, 788 F.3d 1212,  
 28 1224–25 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The statute at issue there listed nine statutory criteria; if those criteria

1 were satisfied, the agency bore a *nondiscretionary* duty to perform a specific action . . . . [I]f they  
2 have been met, BSEE *must* approve the plan.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, giving meaning  
3 to both aspects of the panel’s charge under Issue 5—“criteria” as well as “guidelines”—the Court  
4 finds that the Consent Decree grants the Panel authority to establish substantive, outcome-  
5 determinative rules governing how LSAC reviews requests for accommodations.

6 For the most part, however, the Report does not establish mandatory criteria of that sort.  
7 Only a relatively small number of the Panel’s recommendations dictate an outcome without  
8 providing room for some exercise of judgment by LSAC’s reviewers. Many of the  
9 recommendations that LSAC asserts “mandat[e] outcomes” in fact, by their own terms, require  
10 reviewers to exercise professional judgment. For example, the Report provides that a request for  
11 no more than 50% extra time “that is appropriately documented, shall be granted,” but the  
12 documentation requirement includes “a reasonable explanation for each testing accommodation as  
13 it relates to the candidate’s disability,” and a “clear explanation of why a specific amount of time  
14 is requested.” Report at 16; *see* Appeal at 23–24. Although that guidance dictates that a request  
15 “shall be granted” if the documentation criteria are met, a reviewer must exercise judgment in  
16 determining whether the documentation reasonably and clearly explains a need for the  
17 accommodation. Along the same lines, the guidance that “LSAC shall presumptively grant testing  
18 accommodation requests that do not involve requests for extra time” does not dictate outcomes,  
19 but merely establishes a default presumption that may be overcome if the reviewer determines in  
20 his or her professional judgment that the accommodation is not warranted. *See* Report at 11;  
21 Appeal at 24.

22 Further, the Report provides that “[n]othing in these criteria or standards prevents the  
23 reviewer from using his or her professional judgment, but these decisions must be clearly  
24 explained in detail.” Report at 12. The Parties appear to have overlooked this provision in their  
25 written arguments, but the Court finds that it significantly limits those few portions of the Report  
26 which, read in isolation, appear to require the sort of “mandatory outcome” to which LSAC  
27 repeatedly objects.

28 For example, in Part II of the response to Issue 5, “[i]t is the Panel’s recommendation that

1 individuals with an established diagnosis of major psychiatric disorders shall be given a minimum  
 2 of 50% additional time, and extra breaks, as requested.” *Id.* at 17, ¶ 3(b)(iii). Read in isolation,  
 3 this appears to require that all individuals with such a diagnosis will receive at least 50% extra  
 4 time and additional breaks. Read in the context of the Report as a whole, however, it calls for that  
 5 outcome *unless* the reviewer, “using his or her professional judgment,” determines that such  
 6 accommodations are not warranted and explains that decision “in detail.” *See id.* at 12. As an  
 7 additional example, the same is true of the provisions in Part I stating that a “candidate will be  
 8 considered to have a disability” if he or she produces certain documentation and “certifies that he  
 9 or she continues to have a disability.” *Id.* at 13, ¶ 1(b). In the context of the Report as whole,  
 10 however, a reviewer may determine in his or her professional judgment that such a candidate does  
 11 not have a disability, so long as the reviewer explains that decision in detail. *See id.* at 12.

12 Accordingly, in each instance where—without otherwise providing for an exercise of  
 13 judgment—the Report provides that LSAC “shall” or “will” find a candidate disabled or grant an  
 14 accommodation, the reviewer must respect the Panel’s determination that such an outcome is  
 15 appropriate in most cases meeting the criteria presented in the Report, but may nevertheless reach  
 16 a different outcome if, in the reviewer’s professional judgment, exceptional circumstances justify  
 17 treating the request differently from the normal case anticipated by the Panel, and he or she  
 18 explains in detail the exceptional circumstances that justify a departure from that presumption.

19 This is significant because even if the Court agreed with LSAC that the Panel lacks  
 20 authority to impose outcomes, the Report does no such thing. Instead, it sets a series of guidelines  
 21 for review of requests, some more specific than others, that can be rebutted by a detailed  
 22 explanation of why, in the reviewer’s professional judgment, an exception applies.<sup>11</sup> The Court  
 23 therefore finds no basis to invalidate any portion of the Panel’s responses to Issues 2 and 5 on the  
 24

---

25  
 26  
 27 <sup>11</sup> Plaintiffs also concede that “[n]othing in the Decree or Best Practices [Report] precludes LSAC  
 28 from demonstrating that the provision of a particular auxiliary aid or service would result in a  
 fundamental alteration or undue burden, consistent with the regulation implementing the ADA.”  
 Opp’n at 22.

1 grounds that it purportedly imposes an outcome.<sup>12</sup>

2 b. Consideration of Qualified Professionals and Candidate Statements

3 LSAC objects to a number of provisions stating that reviewers should give deference or  
4 special weight to the opinions and recommendations of qualified professionals who have  
5 examined the candidate. Appeal 18–19. According to LSAC, these provisions conflict with the  
6 Consent Decree, which provides that “LSAC shall consider documentation provided by a qualified  
7 professional who has made an individualized assessment of the candidate.” *See* Consent Decree  
8 ¶ 5(d)(iii) (footnote omitted).

9 The Court finds no conflict. “Considering” a form of evidence or authority is not  
10 inconsistent with giving deference to it. It is perfectly accurate to state that this Court considers  
11 Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent in reaching its decisions—the fact that the Court is  
12 also bound by such precedent does not make that use of the word “consider” improper. Paragraph  
13 5(d)(iii) requires only that LSAC *cannot disregard* documentation submitted by a qualified  
14 professional. It does not bar the Panel from requiring that LSAC give such documentation greater  
15 weight than other evidence. Further, provisions mandating that reviewers give “precedence,”  
16 “deference,” “more weight,” “substantial weight,” or “preference” to a qualified professional’s  
17 diagnosis or recommendation, *see* Report at 10, 12, 13, 19, 20, do not require that a reviewer reach  
18 the outcome supported by that evidence in all cases. So long as the reviewer acknowledges and  
19 applies the appropriate weight to evidence from a qualified professional, he or she may  
20 nevertheless determine, applying his or her professional judgment to the request and supporting  
21 documentation as a whole, that a different outcome is warranted. The Court finds no basis to  
22 invalidate the Report’s provisions regarding documentation from qualified professionals.

23 Substantially the same rationale applies to LSAC’s objection to a provision of the Report  
24 stating that requests for up to 50% extra time “shall be granted” if the “candidate, a qualified  
25

---

26 <sup>12</sup> The same is true of the related objection that certain portions of the Report conflict with  
27 Paragraph 5(d)(v), which provides that “LSAC may consider objective evidence relating to the  
28 candidate’s diagnosed impairment and its impact on the candidate.” Consent Decree ¶ 5(d)(v);  
*see, e.g.*, Appeal at 17. Reviewers may consider any evidence in the candidate’s file in the process  
of exercising their professional judgment.

1 professional, or a teacher . . . provide[s] a reasonable explanation for each testing  
 2 accommodation,” constituting “a clear explanation of why a specific amount of time is requested.”  
 3 Appeal at 23–24 (quoting Report at 16, ¶¶ 2(c)–(d)). LSAC argues that this conflicts with the  
 4 Consent Decree’s provision that “LSAC shall consider all facts and explanations offered by the  
 5 candidate.” *See* Consent Decree ¶ 5(d)(1). As discussed above, there is no conflict between  
 6 “considering” a type of evidence and affording it some degree of deference. Moreover, the  
 7 reviewer in fact *must* consider the candidate’s (or professional’s or teacher’s) statement—as  
 8 required by the Consent Decree—to determine whether, in the reviewer’s professional judgment, it  
 9 offers a “reasonable” and “clear explanation” of the need for the accommodation—as required by  
 10 the Report. *See* Report at 16, ¶¶ 2(c)–(d). The Court finds no conflict and no basis to invalidate  
 11 these provisions.

12 c. Considerable Weight Given to Education Plans

13 LSAC objects to the provisions of the Report stating that a candidate “will be found to  
 14 have a disability” if he or she provides documentation of a disability recognized by certain  
 15 enumerated education programs, such as an Individualized Education Program or a Section 504  
 16 Plan. Appeal at 20–21; *see* Report at 12–13, ¶¶ 1(a)(i)–(iv). According to LSAC, these provisions  
 17 conflict with Paragraph 5(d)(ii) of the Consent Decree, which provides that LSAC will give  
 18 “considerable weight” to such past accommodations. *See* Appeal at 20–21; Consent Decree  
 19 ¶ 5(d)(ii).

20 The fact that the Consent Decree requires “considerable weight” for certain education  
 21 plans does not remove those plans from the realm of the Panel’s authority under Issue 5. The  
 22 Panel remains free to establish criteria and guidelines related to such plans—including defining  
 23 “considerable weight” as it has done here—so long as that guidance does not conflict with the  
 24 Consent Decree’s requirement that LSAC afford them considerable weight. The challenged  
 25 criteria do not conflict with the Consent Decree. As previously discussed, read in the context of  
 26 the Report as a whole, the challenged provisions require a finding of disability unless the reviewer  
 27 determines in his or her professional judgment that such a finding is not warranted, and explains in  
 28 detail what exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the presumption set forth in the



1 Report. *See* Report at 12 (“Nothing in these criteria or standards prevents the reviewer from using  
2 his or her professional judgment, but these decisions must be clearly explained in detail.”). The  
3 Court finds no conflict between that standard and the “considerable weight” required by the  
4 Consent Decree.

5 d. Considerable Weight Given to Past Testing Accommodations

6 LSAC similarly objects to the Report’s instruction that past accommodation in any of a  
7 number of test settings—ranging from “K-12 informal testing accommodations” to “[s]imilar  
8 accommodations on previous standardized . . . examinations”—is sufficient to warrant providing  
9 accommodations so long as the candidate is not requesting more than 50% extra time. *See* Report  
10 at 15, ¶ 1(a)(i)–(vi); Appeal at 21–23. According to LSAC, this improperly invalidates the  
11 distinction that the Consent Decree draws between certain standardized tests enumerated in  
12 Paragraph 5(a)—which automatically warrant certain equivalent accommodations—and “similar  
13 testing situations not covered by Paragraph 5(a),” which warrant “considerable weight” under  
14 Paragraph 5(d)(ii). *See* Consent Decree ¶ 5(a) & n.4; *id.* ¶ 5(d)(ii).

15 This guideline—that a candidate with past testing accommodations should receive  
16 comparable accommodation on the LSAT unless a reviewer explains in detail why, in his or her  
17 professional judgment, exceptional circumstances warrant a different outcome—is wholly  
18 consistent with the Consent Decree’s standard of “considerable weight.” The extreme scenario  
19 discussed in LSAC’s Appeal—“an informal accommodation in kindergarten or elementary  
20 school,” Appeal at 23—is precisely the sort of situation where a reviewer might determine the  
21 accommodation sought on the LSAT is not, in fact, “comparable,”<sup>13</sup> or might exercise professional  
22 judgment and explain why that evidence is not sufficient. Where an accommodation is found to  
23 be comparable, a reviewer may still “us[e] his or her professional judgment,” *see* Report at 12, but  
24 as discussed above, must acknowledge the Panel’s determination that such past accommodations  
25 are normally sufficient, and explain in detail what exceptional circumstances of the request at

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>13</sup> Plaintiffs acknowledged at the July 31, 2015 hearing that LSAC reviewers retain discretion in  
28 determining whether a past accommodation is “comparable” to the accommodation requested on  
the LSAT, and that informal accommodations provided in kindergarten are unlikely to be  
comparable.

1 issue differ from the normal case anticipated by the Panel and thus justify a departure from that  
2 presumption.

3 The Court is not persuaded by LSAC's argument that the criteria set by the Panel for  
4 requests falling under Paragraphs 5(b)–(d) must differ from the criteria set by the Consent Decree  
5 for requests falling under Paragraph 5(a)—i.e., that evidence of past accommodation for another  
6 test is sufficient to receive comparable accommodation for the LSAT. LSAC argues that the  
7 distinction between Paragraphs 5(a) and 5(b)–(d) represents the Parties' "narrowly-drawn  
8 compromise." Appeal at 22. But while the Consent Decree undeniably represents the Parties'  
9 compromise, it is not so "narrowly-drawn" as LSAC now argues. Nothing in the Consent Decree  
10 states that Paragraph 5(a) sets forth the *only* circumstances in which past testing accommodations  
11 may be dispositive of a candidate's request, and the Court cannot assume that Plaintiffs would  
12 have agreed to such a restriction on the Panel's authority. *See Armour & Co.*, 402 U.S. at 681–82  
13 ("Because [each party] has, by the decree, waived [its] right to litigate the issues raised, . . . the  
14 conditions upon which [it] has given that waiver must be respected, and the instrument must be  
15 construed as it is written . . ."). Acting within its authority to establish criteria for review, the  
16 Panel was free to require that other tests and past accommodations besides those listed in  
17 Paragraph 5(a) be given dispositive weight.

18 Regardless of whether the Panel had authority to create such rules, it did not do so. Even if  
19 the Court were to accept LSAC's argument regarding the structure of the Consent Decree, the  
20 provisions of the Report addressing past testing accommodations do not nullify the distinction  
21 between the Paragraph 5(a) tests and all other tests. As discussed above, the Report provides that  
22 "[n]othing in these criteria or standards prevents the reviewer from using his or her professional  
23 judgment," *see* Report at 12, and a reviewer may determine in exceptional cases that even  
24 comparable past testing accommodations should not be granted for the LSAT. In contrast, there is  
25 no room for professional judgment under the automatic procedure of Paragraph 5(a). The Court  
26 finds no basis to invalidate the Report's provisions regarding past testing accommodations.

27 e. Presumptive Approval of Non-Time Accommodations

28 LSAC objects to the Panel's instruction that "LSAC shall presumptively grant testing

1 accommodations that do not involve requests for extended time” so long as the candidate  
 2 documents his or her disability. Appeal at 24–25 (quoting Report at 11). This provision of the  
 3 Report comes from the introductory portion of Issue 5, and appears to summarize the more  
 4 detailed requirements discussed later in that section. *See* Report at 11. The Court does not read it  
 5 as negating the requirement that a candidate satisfy some portion of Part II to show what  
 6 accommodation is appropriate by, for example, submitting evidence of past testing  
 7 accommodations or a “reasonable explanation for each testing accommodation as it relates to the  
 8 candidate’s disability.” *See id.* at 15–16, ¶¶ 1–2.

9 To the extent that LSAC argues that this provision improperly mandates an outcome and  
 10 conflicts with LSAC’s right to request supplemental materials, *see id.*, the Court disagrees for the  
 11 reasons discussed above. LSAC also argues that this standard “shows a complete disregard for the  
 12 importance of standardized testing conditions” and “reflects a lack of appreciation for the wide  
 13 range of non-time accommodations that are requested on standardized tests, many of which may  
 14 be unreasonable, unnecessary, or otherwise inappropriate.” Appeal at 25. Even if that is true, it is  
 15 not a basis for appeal under the Consent Decree. The Parties reasonably elected to delegate these  
 16 issues to a panel of experts rather than try them before the Court. There is no basis for the Court  
 17 to substitute its judgment for that of the Panel. The Court notes, however, that the more extreme  
 18 examples that LSAC puts forward may be situations where a reviewer would exercise his or her  
 19 professional judgment to deny a request. Further, as noted above, Plaintiffs concede that LSAC  
 20 retains the right to “demonstrat[e] that the provision of a particular auxiliary aid or service would  
 21 result in a fundamental alteration or undue burden, consistent with the regulation implementing  
 22 the ADA.” Opp’n at 22.

23 f. Differentiation by Type of Disability or Accommodation Requested

24 LSAC objects to a number of instances where the Report sets forth different standards of  
 25 review based on the type of disability claimed, the accommodation requested, or some  
 26 combination of the two. Appeal at 26–28. According to LSAC, “[s]uch recommendations conflict  
 27 with Paragraph 5(d) of the Decree, which sets out the standards applicable to *all* accommodation  
 28 requests, regardless of the type of accommodation requested or the nature of the underlying

1 disability.” *Id.* at 26. As with the Issue 2 documentation standards discussed above, however, the  
 2 Court finds nothing in the Consent Decree to support this argument. The fact that the Consent  
 3 Decree and the ADA do not themselves differentiate between these kinds of requests does not  
 4 prohibit the Panel from making such distinctions in fulfilling its charge to “establish criteria and  
 5 guidelines for use by persons who review or evaluate testing accommodation requests.” *See*  
 6 Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(3). The Court finds no basis to invalidate these provisions of the  
 7 Report.

### 8 **E. Issue 8: Automatic Review of Denials**

9 This issue broadly tasks the Panel with determining whether full or partial denials of  
 10 accommodation requests should be subject to “an automatic review,” and if so, “how such a  
 11 review should be conducted.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(6). The Panel determined that denials  
 12 must be automatically reviewed by multiple additional reviewers, and set forth a procedure for  
 13 such review. Report at 22–24. This section of the Report also includes standards for LSAC’s  
 14 first-level review of accommodation requests. *See id.* at 22.

#### 15 **1. First-Level Review**

16 In the Consent Decree, Issue 8 concerns only “automatic review[s] of partial and/or full  
 17 denials.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(6). It provides the Panel no authority to directly alter  
 18 LSAC’s procedure for initially reviewing accommodation requests. *See id.* In reviewing the  
 19 Panel’s recommendations for first-level review, the Court therefore looks to whether other  
 20 portions of the Consent Decree provide such authority.

21 First, the Report provides that although candidates generally “must submit all their records  
 22 in support of a testing accommodation by the applicable registration date,” *id.*, *see also* Consent  
 23 Decree ¶ 5(f), LSAC should “waive the regular deadline and make every effort to accommodate  
 24 [a] candidate” who “unexpectedly acquires a disability after the registration deadline.” Report at  
 25 22. As stated in the Report, “[t]he Panel understands that this recommendation goes beyond its  
 26 authority under the Consent Decree but believes it is a Best Practice.” *Id.* The Court construes  
 27 that statement as a concession that LSAC is not bound by this recommendation regarding late-  
 28 onset disabilities, and so holds. Although LSAC may adopt this recommendation if it so chooses,

1 nothing in the Consent Decree requires LSAC to consider requests for accommodation submitted  
2 after the LSAT registration deadline.

3 Next, the Report lays out a process for first-level review as follows:

4 The Disabilities Specialist [(an LSAC employee)] shall review each  
5 file and make a recommendation whether to approve the requested  
6 accommodations in full, to approve in part, or to deny in full. He or  
7 she will then prepare a written summary based on a checklist of  
8 decision-making criteria (as described in response to Issue 5) that  
9 explains the reasoning for that decision, using a holistic approach to  
10 the file. This review shall occur within two business days of the  
11 Disability Specialist receiving a completed file.

12 *Id.* LSAC objects to this paragraph in its entirety, except for the portion requiring the Disabilities  
13 Specialist to prepare a written summary based on a checklist of criteria. LSAC Redline at 22.  
14 While LSAC is correct that these provisions of the Report are not authorized by Issue 8, the Court  
15 finds that they fall within the Panel’s authority under Issue 5 to establish “criteria and guidelines  
16 for use by persons who review or evaluate testing accommodation requests.” *See* Consent Decree  
17 ¶¶ 7(c)(iii)(3). That the Disabilities Specialist must recommend whether to approve in full,  
18 approve in part, or deny in full are “criteria.” That he or she should “us[e] a holistic approach to  
19 the file” is a “guideline.” The Court therefore declines to invalidate these provisions.

20 The two-day deadline goes beyond the Panel’s authority, and improperly purports to  
21 regulate an aspect of the *process* of first-level review that was not delegated to the Panel under any  
22 of its ten issues. The same is true of the provision that if the single Disabilities Specialist that  
23 LSAC currently employs cannot meet the two-day deadline, “then LSAC shall hire additional,  
24 qualified staff as Disabilities Specialists to make that deadline feasible,” because “[e]mploying  
25 adequate, qualified staff is a Best Practice.” Report at 22. Because the Panel could not require  
26 LSAC to meet the two-day internal review deadline, it certainly could not require the hiring of  
27 staff to meet that deadline. Except as specified in the Consent Decree, it is for LSAC to determine  
28 *how* it will meet its obligations thereunder (including compliance with the binding portions of the  
Report). The Court therefore holds that these recommendations are not binding on LSAC.

As discussed below, however, the Consent Decree grants the Panel explicit authority to  
determine whether and how LSAC should (1) automatically review decisions to deny requests;

1 and (2) allow candidates to seek further review of its final decision, and the Report provides for  
 2 such processes. *See* Consent Decree ¶¶ 7(c)(iii)(6), (7); Report at 23–28. LSAC must therefore  
 3 complete its internal review—including review by the Manager of Accommodated Testing as  
 4 discussed below—in sufficient time to allow for the automatic review and appeals process  
 5 established by the Panel in response to Issues 8 and 9. Because the automatic review by outside  
 6 consultants takes four business days, Report at 23–24, transmission to the candidate takes one  
 7 business day, *id.* at 24, the candidate has four calendar days to submit an appeal, *id.* at 25, and the  
 8 appeal must be received at least twelve calendar days before the test, *id.*, LSAC effectively must  
 9 complete its internal review no later than five business days before the business day that is at least  
 10 sixteen calendar days before the LSAT test date.<sup>14</sup> This timeline only applies to candidates who  
 11 register and request accommodation by the “regular” deadline; the process for candidates who  
 12 elect to use LSAC’s “late registration” deadline is discussed separately in the portion of this Order  
 13 addressing Issue 9.

## 14 **2. Internal Manager’s Role in Review**

15 After the “first-level review” by the Disabilities Specialist, the Report provides that  
 16 another existing LSAC employee, the Manager of Accommodated Testing (the “Manager”), “shall  
 17 review the file within two business days” and either “approve the requested testing  
 18 accommodation in full, or write a clear rationale explaining the decision not to approve a testing  
 19 accommodation in full.” *Id.* at 22–23. If the Manager approves the request in full, the written  
 20 summaries prepared by LSAC staff “shall be retained in LSAC’s records to be reviewed in the  
 21 future for consistency or training purposes,” and “the candidate shall receive a communication  
 22 within one business day stating that his or her . . . request has been approved in full.” *Id.* at 23.

23 LSAC objects to these portions of the Report because they “relate solely to the internal  
 24

---

25 <sup>14</sup> The unavoidably awkward structure of this deadline arises from the Report’s timeline switching  
 26 from business days in the context of automatic review to calendar days in the context of an appeal.  
 27 While it is somewhat cumbersome to explain, it is not particularly difficult to calculate for a test  
 28 that is only administered a handful of times per year. For example, the internal review deadlines  
 for the next three regular LSAT test dates—on October 3, 2015, December 5, 2015, and February  
 6, 2016—are September 10, 2015, November 12, 2015, and January 13, 2016, respectively  
 (assuming that LSAC observes federal holidays).

1 process leading up to LSAC’s initial decision to grant or deny a request.” Appeal at 29. Again,  
2 LSAC is correct that Issue 8 does not relate to the process by which LSAC reaches its initial  
3 decision. The Court nevertheless finds that the Panel had authority to require that the Manager  
4 review the Disability Specialist’s “recommendations” to deny requests for accommodation.

5 Issue 4 authorizes the Panel to determine “whether more than one qualified professional  
6 should review a documented request for testing accommodations before LSAC may deny the  
7 request in whole or in part.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(2). As LSAC correctly argues, “[t]his  
8 straightforward query contemplated a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response.” Reply at 7. Although very  
9 little about the Panel’s Report can be characterized as “simple,” the framework set forth in  
10 response to Issue 8 unambiguously answers “yes” to Issue 4: more than one person should review  
11 a request before LSAC may deny it. *See* Report at 22–23. Issue 3, which LSAC does not  
12 challenge, permits the Panel to “establish the appropriate qualifications for persons, such as LSAC  
13 staff . . . who make substantive adverse decisions on requests.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(1). The  
14 Panel is therefore within its authority in requiring that the initial review must be conducted by a  
15 Disabilities Specialist, that at least one more professional should review the request before LSAC  
16 may deny it, and that the second professional must be the Manager of Accommodated Testing.  
17 Because the Manager is among the “persons who review or evaluate testing accommodation  
18 requests,” the Panel is authorized by Issue 5 to establish criteria and guidelines for his or her use in  
19 reviewing requests, including a requirement to “write a clear rationale” for any denial. Consent  
20 Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(3); Report at 22–23. The Panel is also authorized to require LSAC to maintain  
21 records of its reasons for granting a request, *see* Report at 23, because Issue 6 charges the Panel to  
22 “consider whether there should be particular parameters for internally documenting written  
23 decisions by LSAC personnel . . . and, if so, what those parameters should be.” *See* Consent  
24 Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(4).

25 On the other hand, the requirement that the Manager complete his or her review within two  
26 days is invalid because the Panel had no authority to set internal timelines for LSAC’s review. As  
27 discussed above, the only deadline for such review is that LSAC must reach its decision in time to  
28 allow for the automatic outside review of denials and the appeals process set forth in response to

1 Issues 8 and 9, respectively.

2 Further, the Panel cannot require the Manager to review the Disability Specialist's  
3 determination that an accommodation should be granted in full. Nothing in the Consent Decree  
4 prohibits LSAC from granting an accommodation based on a single reviewer's decision, nor does  
5 the Consent Decree empower the Panel to establish procedures that require multiple people to  
6 review a request before that request can be *granted*, because Issue 4 is limited to situations where  
7 LSAC "den[ies] the request in whole or in part." *See* Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(2). The  
8 requirement that the Manager review a recommendation to grant an accommodation in full is not  
9 binding on LSAC.

10 The Report's requirement that LSAC notify a candidate within one business day of the  
11 decision that his or her request has been granted also does not fall within the scope of any issue  
12 delegated to the Panel. Report at 23. As discussed above, the Panel had no authority to set  
13 deadlines for LSAC's internal review process. Nor is this requirement authorized by Issue 7—  
14 "Written explanations for denials of testing authorizations"—because it concerns accommodations  
15 that are granted, rather than denied. *See id.* ¶ 7(c)(iii)(5). The one-day notification requirement  
16 for approvals is therefore not binding on LSAC.

### 17 3. External Review

18 If the Manager determines that a request should be denied in full or in part, the Report sets  
19 forth a procedure for automatic external review. LSAC must transmit the file to an outside  
20 consultant of its choice who has relevant expertise and agrees to review the file within two  
21 working days. Report at 23. The outside consultant must then review the file and reach a  
22 conclusion to agree with the candidate's request in full, agree in full with LSAC's full or partial  
23 denial, or suggest a partial approval falling between the candidate's request and LSAC's position.  
24 *Id.* "The outside consultant will provide a justification of his or her decision in writing." *Id.* If  
25 the consultant agrees with the candidate in full, then the "consultant's determination will become  
26 the final determination of LSAC for that candidate's request." *Id.* at 23—24. Otherwise, the file  
27 goes to a second consultant selected by the same process, who may either approve the request in  
28 full or endorse the position of the first consultant. *Id.* at 24. The second consultant must also



1 justify his or her decision in writing. “Where a second outside consultant is used . . . the decision  
2 by the second outside consultant is the final decision on the request for testing accommodation.”  
3 *Id.*

4 The candidate will be notified of the outcome of this process within one business day of  
5 the decision. *Id.* If the request is not granted in full, LSAC must provide a decision letter  
6 explaining the rationale of its decision, including “[q]uoted statements from the written summaries  
7 and checklist indicators.” *Id.* The letter must also “include clear suggestions, with examples, for  
8 any additional information that might be helpful in the appeal process,” and an explanation of that  
9 process. *Id.*

10 LSAC objects to this portion of the Panel’s Report on a number of grounds. First, LSAC  
11 argues that Issue 8 only contemplated “‘an automatic review’ . . . *i.e.*, *one* review.” Appeal at 30  
12 (quoting Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(6)) (emphasis added in Appeal). According to LSAC, “the  
13 Panel did not have the authority to impose two external reviews on LSAC.” *Id.* The Court  
14 disagrees with the premise that the process described above falls outside the scope of “an  
15 automatic review.” A “review” can encompass multiple steps and multiple reviewers. The  
16 Panel’s decision to establish a review process that may include two outside consultants falls within  
17 the Panel’s authority to determine “how [an automatic] review should be conducted.” *See* Consent  
18 Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(6).

19 LSAC also argues that the Panel exceeded its authority by:

20 making the decisions of the external reviewers binding on LSAC;  
21 mandating the types of decisions that external reviewers may make  
22 (*i.e.*, external reviewers cannot reject any accommodation previously  
23 granted by LSAC, even if the external reviewer concludes that  
24 accommodations are unwarranted and even though the external  
25 reviewer’s decision is supposed to be binding on LSAC); mandating  
26 the time within which the external reviewer must provide his or her  
27 opinion; and dictating how and when LSAC’s decisions must be  
28 conveyed to the candidates.

25 Appeal at 30 (citations to the Report omitted); *see also* Reply at 7–8. LSAC appears to believe it  
26 self-evident that such determinations exceed the Panel’s authority, but fails to explain why any of  
27 these issues fall outside of the Panel’s mandate to determine “how such a review should be  
28 conducted.” *See* Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(6). LSAC agreed to that provision in the Consent

1 Decree, which by its plain language grants the Panel broad authority, and one of LSAC's  
 2 appointees to the Panel joined in establishing the procedure set forth in the Report. The Court  
 3 finds no basis to invalidate any portion of the Report concerning automatic review by outside  
 4 consultants.<sup>15</sup>

5 **F. Issue 9: Appeals Process**

6 This issue asked the Panel to consider whether LSAC should provide, for candidates  
 7 denied accommodations, an appeals process “beyond that already provided by LSAC . . . and, if  
 8 so, what that process should be relative to LSAC’s existing registration deadlines.” Consent  
 9 Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(7).

10 **1. Appeals Process Described in the Panel’s Report**

11 The Panel determined that such a process should be available, and “recommend[ed] that  
 12 the candidate shall be able to submit an appeal up to twelve days before the actual administration  
 13 of the exam” and perhaps even later, depending on circumstances. Report at 25. After the  
 14 candidate receives notice that his or her request was not granted in full—as discussed above,  
 15 within one business day of the decision—“[t]he candidate will have at least 24 hours . . . to  
 16 indicate *if* the candidate desires to appeal,” or more time if the candidate submitted his or her  
 17 initial request before the registration deadline. *Id.* at 25–26 (emphasis added). The Report states  
 18 that LSAC must give the candidate a total of at least four days from notification of the adverse  
 19 decision to submit his or her appeal, and that “[m]ore than four days can be provided to the  
 20 candidate . . . if that appeal can be received within twelve days before the scheduled test date.” *Id.*  
 21 “In [his or her] appeal, the candidate may request a different testing accommodation than  
 22 requested in his or her original request for testing accommodations.” *Id.* at 28. “If the candidate  
 23 desires more than four days to transmit an appeal, and those additional days would cause the file  
 24

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
 26 <sup>15</sup> The Panel’s authority under Issue 8 to determine “how [an automatic] review [of denials] should  
 27 be conducted” is significantly broader than its authority regarding LSAC’s initial review of  
 28 requests for accommodation. Accordingly, this Order reaches different conclusions as to certain  
 portions of the Report that mandate similar steps at different stages of the review process—e.g.,  
 while the Panel lacks authority to mandate that a decision to grant accommodation on initial  
 review be transmitted within one business day, it has authority to require such notice in the context  
 of automatic review of a denial.

1 to be received less than twelve days before the scheduled test date, then the candidate can request  
 2 that his or her application for testing accommodations be rolled-over to the next LSAC testing  
 3 cycle with no additional cost.” *Id.* at 26.

4 Upon receiving notice that the candidate intends to appeal, “LSAC shall contact two  
 5 outside appeals consultants [with relevant expertise] (using the process described above [in Issue  
 6 8]) to ensure their availability in the event the appeals process is invoked.” *Id.* at 26. These are to  
 7 be different consultants than those who initially reviewed the denial of the candidate’s request  
 8 under the Issue 8 automatic review process. *See id.* at 28 (“LSAC will immediately secure two  
 9 different outside consultants . . . .”). Once LSAC receives the actual appeal, it has twenty-four  
 10 hours to decide whether to grant the request or to proceed with an appeal. *Id.* at 26. If it does not  
 11 grant the accommodation, it must transmit the appeal and the candidate’s file to the first appeals  
 12 consultant for review under a process similar to that described in Issue 8, but with a twenty-four  
 13 hour deadline. *Id.* The first consultant may approve the request in full, approve in part (but not  
 14 less than LSAC’s initial determination), or concur with LSAC’s initial decision. *Id.* at 28. If the  
 15 first consultant does not grant the request in full, the appeal goes to the second consultant, who has  
 16 twenty-four hours to “choose between the recommendation of the first outside appeals consultant  
 17 and the candidate’s request.” *Id.*

18 LSAC must provide the result to the candidate within one week of the candidate  
 19 submitting the appeal. *Id.* at 26. “LSAC will never refuse to provide the results of an appeal (or a  
 20 full consideration) because there is insufficient time to implement the requested testing  
 21 accommodation for that examination cycle, unless the candidate indicates that he or she would like  
 22 to terminate the testing accommodation request.” *Id.*

## 23 **2. Arguments and Analysis**

24 LSAC asks the Court to strike nearly all of this section, leaving only the requirements that:  
 25 (1) a candidate may submit an appeal (with the timeline and deadline for such an appeal not  
 26 specified); (2) LSAC may choose to grant the request or proceed with the appeal; and (3) the  
 27 appeals process will involve two outside consultants and follow the procedure described in Issue  
 28 8—presumably as modified by LSAC’s objections to that issue, so that there is no deadline for a

1 response and the result is not binding on LSAC. *See* LSAC Redline at 25–29; *see also id.* at 22–  
2 24 (proposed revisions to Issue 8). According to LSAC, the Panel’s response to this issue is “an  
3 effort to circumvent [the] agreed-upon restriction” that the Panel would not alter LSAC’s existing  
4 registration deadline by “devis[ing] an appeals process that is virtually impossible to  
5 operationalize, with the fallback that LSAC can just approve requests if the Panel’s facially  
6 unreasonable appeal process and deadlines cannot be met.” Appeal at 31; *see also* Reply at 13  
7 (“At the very least, the challenged aspects of the recommended appeal process are not ‘consistent’  
8 with LSAC’s existing registration deadlines because they are not realistic.”). Plaintiffs argue that  
9 this is not a valid basis for appeal under the Consent Decree, and dispute LSAC’s assertion that  
10 the Report’s appeals process is not feasible. *See* Opp’n at 24 (“[T]he Report explains in great  
11 detail how [the appeals process] can feasibly be implemented.”).

12 As a starting point, it is questionable that the Court has authority to invalidate a provision  
13 of the Panel’s Report because it is “facially unreasonable,” or “unrealistic.” The Consent Decree  
14 provides the Parties a limited right to appeal to the Court if a provision of the Report is “believed  
15 to violate the ADA or its implementing regulations, or California law where applicable, or to  
16 conflict with the provisions of this Decree.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(d)(vii). It includes no provision  
17 for an appeal based on the reasonableness of the Panel’s choices.

18 In any event, even assuming that the Court has such authority, LSAC has provided no  
19 evidence whatsoever to support its contention that the prescribed appeals process is not feasible.  
20 The Parties selected members of the Panel in part based on “expertise in the provision of testing  
21 accommodations within the context of standardized test administration.” *Id.* ¶ 7(a). Presented  
22 only with the Parties’ unsupported characterizations of the appeals process as, on the one hand,  
23 “virtually impossible to operationalize” and, on the other hand, a process that “can feasibly be  
24 implemented”—*see* Appeal at 31; Opp’n at 24; *see also* Reply at 13—the Court declines to  
25 substitute its own judgment for that of the Panel, which the Parties selected specifically to  
26 determine “what that process should be.” *See* Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(7). The Court therefore  
27 declines to invalidate the Panel’s decisions regarding the appeals process, except as discussed  
28 below in the limited context of “late registration” requests for accommodation.

1 LSAC’s only more specific objection to the Panel’s response to this issue is that “[t]he  
2 Panel also exceeded its authority . . . by regulating examination costs and candidate payment  
3 obligations,” Appeal at 31 n.26, specifically by providing that a candidate should have the option  
4 to “request that his or her application for testing accommodations be rolled-over to the next LSAC  
5 testing cycle with no additional cost”<sup>16</sup> if he or she “desires more than four days to transmit an  
6 appeal,” Report at 26. LSAC has not adequately explained why the Consent Decree’s broadly-  
7 written mandate to determine “what [the appeals] process should be” would not allow the Panel to  
8 identify circumstances where an appeal should involve continuing the candidate’s test date to the  
9 next regularly scheduled LSAT test in order to allow adequate time to submit and consider an  
10 appeal. Nor has LSAC identified any provision of the Consent Decree, the ADA, or California  
11 state law that conflicts with this process. In fact, LSAC seems to agree that “[a]ny decisions on  
12 appeals that cannot be made within established deadlines can apply with respect to the next test  
13 administration,” *see* Appeal at 31, but apparently would like to reserve the right to charge  
14 candidates a second registration fee in such circumstances, *see id.* at 31 n.26. In the Court’s view,  
15 the fees that apply in those circumstances are a part of the appeals process, and thus fall within the  
16 Panel’s broad authority under Issue 9 to determine “what that process should be.” *See* Consent  
17 Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(7). The Court therefore finds no basis to invalidate this provision of the Report.

18 One provision of the Consent Decree could be construed as bearing on the Panel’s  
19 authority to set an appeals process, although neither party addresses it in the context of their  
20 arguments on this issue. The Consent Decree requires LSAC to notify candidates that the  
21 registration deadline is “also the deadline for . . . LSAC to receive any request for reconsideration  
22 of LSAC’s testing accommodations determinations.” Consent Decree ¶ 5(f). This deadline is  
23 inconsistent with the Report’s deadline allowing an appeal to be filed, at least in some  
24 circumstances, until twelve days before the test date. *See* Report at 25–26. LSAC may have  
25 chosen not to rely on this provision, however, because the Consent Decree specifically provides  
26

---

27 <sup>16</sup> The Court construes this provision as allowing the candidate to roll over his or request for  
28 accommodation and his or her registration to take the test to the next test date. It does not  
authorize a candidate to take the LSAT twice for a single registration fee.

1 that the notice “language is subject to further direction from the Panel regarding the need for and  
2 availability of an appeals process and, if needed, what that process should be.” Consent Decree  
3 ¶ 5(f). The Court therefore finds that the Panel acted within its authority in allowing an appeal to  
4 be filed after the registration deadline. The notice provided pursuant to Paragraph 5(f) of the  
5 Consent Decree shall conform to the appeals process detailed in the Report.

### 6 **3. Appeals After Late Registration**

7 The Report includes a sample timeline for a full review process, including appeal, based on  
8 a June 9, 2014 test date. Report at 26–29. That timeline is based on a request for accommodation  
9 made on the “regular registration deadline” of May 6, 2014. *Id.* at 27. Although the Court is  
10 satisfied that the process is consistent with LSAC’s “regular registration” deadlines, the Court  
11 takes notice of the fact that LSAC also offers “late registration” deadlines for an extra fee, and  
12 appears to allow candidates who register on those dates to request accommodations. *See* LSAC,  
13 *Accommodations Request Packet* (rev. May 2015).<sup>17</sup>

14 The process outlined in the Report is not consistent with the late registration deadlines.  
15 For LSAC’s February 6, 2016 test date, the late registration deadline is January 15, 2016, *see id.*,  
16 which—even ignoring any time for internal review by LSAC’s Disabilities Specialist and  
17 Manager—does not leave enough time to complete the automatic review by outside consultants  
18 established in response to Issue 8, allow the candidate four days to submit an appeal, and receive  
19 that appeal twelve days before the test, as required by the Report. The late registration deadlines  
20 for October and December 2015 tests would only leave enough time for the automatic review and  
21 appeals processes if LSAC completed both stages of its internal review in a single day, which is  
22 far less time than the Panel intended. *See* Report at 22 (recommending two business days for  
23 review by the Disabilities Specialist and a further two business days for review by the Manager<sup>18</sup>).

24 Neither the Panel nor the Parties raised this issue. The Consent Decree and the Parties’  
25

26 <sup>17</sup> <http://www.lsac.org/docs/default-source/jd-docs/accommodations-form-gen-info.pdf>

27 <sup>18</sup> As discussed above in the context of Issue 8, the Court holds that these internal deadlines are  
28 not binding on LSAC. They are nevertheless useful in understanding the Panel’s intent as to how  
the review would proceed, and support the Court’s conclusion that the Panel did not foresee or  
intend that LSAC would make its initial decision based on only a single day of internal review.

1 statements at the July 31, 2015 hearing make clear that the Parties intended that candidates seeking  
2 accommodation would be able to register and request accommodation on the same registration  
3 deadlines that apply to non-disabled candidates. *See* Consent Decree ¶ 5(f) (providing notice  
4 language regarding deadlines). It is also clear that the Panel, consistent with its charge under Issue  
5 9, intended that an appeals process would be available to candidates whose accommodation  
6 requests are denied, that such candidates would be allowed at least one day to decide whether to  
7 appeal and four days to submit an appeal, and that such appeals would be reviewed by two outside  
8 consultants before they could be denied. *See* Report at 25–26. The Panel further intended that  
9 LSAC would have at least twelve days from the submission of an appeal to allow for its review  
10 and, if warranted, implementation of the accommodation. *Id.* at 25. Finally, the Panel recognized  
11 that it lacked authority to alter LSAC’s existing registration deadlines. *See id.* at 22 n.13.

12 In the limited context of “late registration” requests, the appeals process in the Report  
13 conflicts with the Consent Decree, because—for at least one test date—the process cannot be  
14 completed in the time between the “late registration” deadline and the test. The Consent Decree  
15 empowers the Court to determine “appropriate relief” in the event of a conflict. *See* Consent  
16 Decree ¶ 7(vii). In order to give effect to the Parties’ agreement and the Panel’s determinations,  
17 the Court holds that LSAC must allow candidates who register on the “late registration” deadline  
18 to submit requests for accommodation on that date and to appeal any denials of such request  
19 within four days of receiving LSAC’s final decision. However, if LSAC cannot feasibly complete  
20 the review process for such appeals as outlined in the Report and provide the requested  
21 accommodation by the test date, LSAC must defer appellant candidates’ registrations, requests,  
22 and appeals to the next test date at no extra charge. LSAC must also provide clear notice on its  
23 website and registration materials that selecting the “late registration” deadline may affect a  
24 candidate’s ability to appeal any denial of accommodation in time for that test date, and must  
25 provide similar notice with any denial of a “late registration” accommodation request so that the  
26 candidate can make an informed choice whether to proceed on the original test date without  
27 accommodation or pursue an appeal of the accommodation request for the next test date.

28 Although the Panel lacks authority to directly establish internal deadlines for LSAC’s

1 review, the Court holds—as discussed above in the context of “regular registration”  
2 accommodation requests—that LSAC must conduct its internal evaluation and review in a manner  
3 that leaves sufficient time for the automatic external review and the appeal, if any, established by  
4 the Report. This has implications for the timing of the internal review when a candidate submits a  
5 request for accommodation by the “late registration” deadline. Under the process described  
6 above, the internal process, and the outside review of any whole or partial denial, must be  
7 completed in time for the candidate to either appeal (which may result in the candidate being  
8 delayed to the next test administration) or make the choice to waive any appeal and proceed with  
9 the test as scheduled, with any accommodation that the LSAC internal review and outside  
10 automatic review have determined are appropriate. LSAC must provide the candidate with its  
11 final decision in time to allow the candidate at least twenty-four hours to make that choice. *See*  
12 Report at 26.

13 **G. Issue 10: Training Parameters**

14 The final issue delegated to the Panel is to “consider and establish the parameters, such as  
15 content and timing of, training for persons (both LSAC staff and outside consultants) who evaluate  
16 or review testing accommodation requests.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(8).

17 **1. Annual Training**

18 The Panel determined that “LSAC staff and all outside consultants shall attend an annual  
19 two-day training session” including presentations by experts with experience in standardized  
20 testing accommodations. Report at 29. “During the Consent Decree, at least one member of the  
21 Panel appointed by DOJ and one member of the Panel appointed by LSAC, who has approved all  
22 of the recommendations of the Panel, shall participate in this training session.” *Id.* It also  
23 discusses subjects to be covered and “minimum objectives” to achieve. *Id.* at 29–30.

24 LSAC objects to the requirement that training last two days, and to the mandatory  
25 participation of Panel members. Appeal at 32; Reply at 14–15. LSAC’s objection to the two-day  
26 duration borders on frivolous. The Consent Decree empowers the Panel to “establish the  
27 parameters, such as content and timing of, training.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(8). LSAC argues  
28 that “[w]here specific words follow general words in a contract, the general words are construed to



1 embrace only things similar in nature to those enumerated by the specific words.” Reply at 14  
 2 (quoting *Nygaard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula*, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1045 (2008)). The Court assumes  
 3 for the sake of argument that this principle applies to the provisions at issue. There is no  
 4 reasonable basis, however, to conclude that the duration of training is not a parameter “similar in  
 5 nature to” the timing and content of training. Unless the Panel’s authority were limited to *only* the  
 6 duration and content of training—and by the plain language of the Consent Decree, it is not—it is  
 7 difficult to imagine what “parameters” would fall within its scope if the implied limitation to  
 8 “similar” parameters did not include duration.<sup>19</sup> The Court finds no basis to invalidate the  
 9 requirement for a two-day annual training.

10 LSAC also challenges the provision requiring members of the Panel to participate in  
 11 LSAC’s annual training sessions. Plaintiffs stipulated to strike that provision at the July 31, 2015  
 12 hearing. Accordingly, LSAC need not include members of the Panel in its annual trainings.

## 13 **2. Remedial Training**

14 The Report also calls for “additional training” for any staff member whose decision is  
 15 reversed on review more than 25% of the time—i.e., a first-level reviewer reversed by the  
 16 Manager of Accommodated Testing, or the Manager reversed by an outside consultant. Report at  
 17 30. LSAC is required to keep data on these reversal rates and implement additional training if the  
 18 rate exceeds the 25% threshold at the time of any report that LSAC is required to make under  
 19 Paragraph 23 of the Consent Decree. *Id.*; see also Consent Decree ¶ 23 (describing reports to be  
 20 submitted annually and after each administration of the LSAT). “The nature and timing of that  
 21 training will be determined by DOJ, in consultation with DFEH, on a case-by-case basis  
 22 depending on the reasons for the reversals.” Report at 23.

23 LSAC objects to the requirement that it maintain data on how often decisions are reversed,  
 24 arguing that this exceeds the Panel’s authority under Issue 10 and “effectively invalidates the  
 25 parties’ agreement regarding LSAC’s record-keeping obligations,” because the reversal rate is not

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
 27 <sup>19</sup> The California Court of Appeal’s decision in *Nygaard* dealt with the lack of similarity between,  
 28 on the one hand, a company’s trade secrets, and on the other, information about one individual’s  
 working conditions and another individual’s social life. See *Nygaard, Inc.*, 159 Cal. App. 4th at  
 1045–46. It is not applicable to the case at hand.

1 among the data LSAC is required to track pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Consent Decree. Appeal  
 2 at 32. The Court finds that even if this requirement falls outside the scope of establishing  
 3 parameters for training, it is within the Panel’s authority under Issue 6 to set “parameters for  
 4 internally documenting written decisions by LSAC personnel who make substantive decisions on  
 5 requests for testing accommodation.” Consent Decree ¶ 7(c)(iii)(4). There is no conflict with  
 6 Paragraph 8, because nothing in that paragraph limits the Panel’s authority to require further  
 7 recordkeeping, and construing Paragraph 8 as an exhaustive and exclusive list would effectively  
 8 nullify the Panel’s authority to set parameters for documenting decisions under Issue 6. *See id.*  
 9 ¶ 8. Further, the requirement that reviewers receive training when their reversal rate exceeds 25%  
 10 falls squarely within the Panel’s Issue 10 authority to establish the “timing of” training. *Id.*  
 11 ¶ 7(c)(iii)(8). The Court finds no reason that the timing of training cannot be contingent on  
 12 conditions that, in the Panel’s judgment, evince a need for such training.

13 The Panel’s delegation of the “nature and timing of that training” to the Department of  
 14 Justice (in consultation with DFEH) is problematic. *See* Report at 30. The Parties agreed in the  
 15 Consent Decree that the Panel would establish parameters for training. Here, the Panel failed to  
 16 do so. Stating that someone else—here, a party to the dispute—will dictate the parameters is not  
 17 itself a parameter, and nothing in the Consent Decree granted the Panel authority to delegate its  
 18 duties to one of the Parties. That delegation is therefore invalid. LSAC must provide remedial  
 19 training as required by the Report, but it may determine appropriate content of such training,  
 20 guided by the parameters set forth in the Report for annual training.

#### 21 **IV. SUMMARY OF THE COURT’S CONCLUSIONS**

22 As discussed in more detail above, the following provisions of the Report are modified or  
 23 invalidated, or otherwise warrant explanation:

24 1. LSAC need not accept evidence of testing for mental or cognitive impairments that  
 25 took place more than five years before the date of request. *See* Report at 6–7, ¶¶ 1(b), 2(a), 3(a);  
 26 Consent Decree ¶ 5(d)(iv).

27 2. Although not a conflict with the Consent Decree, the Report by its own terms states  
 28 that “[n]othing in [the Report’s] criteria or standards prevents the reviewer from using his or her

1 professional judgment, but these decisions must be clearly explained in detail.” Report at 12.  
2 Giving meaning to this provision, the Court reads criteria that describe circumstances where  
3 LSAC “shall” or “will” reach an outcome without otherwise allowing for an exercise of judgment  
4 as presenting a strong presumption that the outcome is appropriate in ordinary circumstances. A  
5 reviewer may depart from that presumption only if he or she acknowledges the Panel’s  
6 determination and explains in detail what exceptional circumstances of the request at issue differ  
7 from the normal case anticipated by the Panel and thus justify a different outcome.

8 3. LSAC need not waive its regular deadlines to accommodate a candidate who  
9 unexpectedly acquires a disability after the registration deadline. *See* Report at 22 (acknowledging  
10 that this recommendation exceeds the Panel’s authority).

11 4. LSAC’s internal reviewers—specifically, its Disabilities Specialist and Manager of  
12 Accommodated Testing—need not complete their respective reviews of requests for  
13 accommodation within two business days. *See* Report at 22–23. LSAC nevertheless must  
14 complete both stages of its internal review in time to allow for automatic review and an appeal as  
15 required above. For a request submitted on or before the “regular” registration deadline, LSAC  
16 must complete its review at least five business days before the last business day that is sixteen  
17 calendar days before the test. For a request submitted based on the “late registration” deadline,  
18 LSAC must complete its review in time to allow for automatic outside review of a denial,  
19 notification to the candidate, and at least one day for the candidate to decide whether to appeal.

20 5. The Panel cannot directly require LSAC to hire additional staff. *See* Report at 22.  
21 LSAC may determine how it will meet its obligations under the Consent Decree and the Report.

22 6. LSAC need not require that its Manager of Accommodated Testing review a  
23 decision by the Disabilities Specialist to *grant* a request for accommodation. *See* Report at 22.

24 7. LSAC need not notify a candidate within one business day if his or her request is  
25 granted on LSAC’s initial review. *See* Report at 23. The Court declines to modify notification  
26 deadlines related to outcomes of automatic outside reviews or appeals, based on the Panel’s  
27 broader authority over those processes under Issues 8 and 9.

28 8. LSAC need not complete review of an appeal before the upcoming test date if the

1 candidate submitted his or her request as part of a “late registration.” If a candidate chooses to  
2 appeal a denial under those circumstances, and LSAC cannot complete the appeal and provide the  
3 requested accommodation by the test date, LSAC must defer the candidate’s registration, request,  
4 and appeal to the next test date at no additional charge.

5 9. LSAC must modify the notice language set forth in Paragraph 5(f) of the Consent  
6 Decree to reflect the appeals process established by the Report and this Order.

7 10. LSAC need not allow members of the Panel to participate in annual training of  
8 LSAC’s reviewers. *See* Report at 29.


9 11. LSAC need not allow the Department of Justice to determine the parameters of  
10 remedial training for LSAC reviewers whose reversal rates exceed 25%. LSAC may determine  
11 the content of such training, guided by the parameters set forth in the Report for annual training.  
12 *See* Report at 30.

13 **V. CONCLUSION**

14 For the reasons stated above, the Court declines to invalidate the challenged provisions of  
15 the Panel’s Report except as specifically discussed.

16 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

17 Dated: August 7, 2015

18   
19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 JOSEPH C. SPERO  
21 Chief Magistrate Judge  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

United States District Court  
Northern District of California